Abstract-Security labels are utilized for several applications. For instance, cross-domain information exchange can be enabled by associating security labels with data objects and enforcing crossdomain information flow control based on these labels (e.g., using guards). The correctness of the security labels is critical to the overall security of such solutions. To assure the correctness of security labels, this paper proposes a flexible framework for trusted information labelling. The proposed solution represents a novel application of attribute based access control (aka. policy-based access control) principles to data labelling. The proposed framework can utilize content verification/analysis, user/application input, information flow monitoring, and contextual information as a basis for its policy-based labelling decisions.
I. Introduction
Security labels provide the means to associate a set of security attributes with a specific information object [1] . Examples of label attributes may include the confidentiality classification of a data object or its handling restrictions. While security labels are often concerned with confidentiality, such as the XML Confidentiality Label [2] , security labels can also be used for aspects such as integrity and availability. In the view of attribute based access control (ABAC) and object-level security, a security label may contain any type of attribute relevant for security decisions.
Consequently, security labels may be utilized for many purposes, including access control and cross-domain information exchange. In the latter case, a guard may be used to enforce cross-domain information flow control by releasing or blocking data objects based on their associated security label. Independent of the exact type of properties specified by the label attributes, security labels are trusted to be correct when security decisions are based upon them. For instance, if a guard releases information from a classified domain to an unclassified domain, based on security labels stating that the information is unclassified, those security labels are trusted to be correct. Thus, the overall security of such a cross-domain solution does not only depend on the security of the guard, but also on the correctness of the security labels.
While the integrity and authenticity of a security label (and its associated data object) can be protected during transport and storage, e.g., using a cryptographic mechanism such as This work was partially funded by the University Graduate Center (UNIK). a digital signature, this does not guarantee that the security label is correct in the first place.
In general, one can say that there are two main bases for determining the correct label attributes (e.g., confidentiality classification) of a data object:
• One is to assess the actual content of the data object to determine the correct attributes of the security label. This can either be based on human judgement (e.g., by the author of the data object or an operator performing a human review) or be based on some type of automated content inspection (e.g., dirty word scanning or a more advanced content analysis).
• The other is to base the properties on the origins of the information in the data object. For instance, it may be known that a specific sensor only produces data of a specific type with a given classification. Likewise, a Restricted domain should not contain any data classified above Restricted, and a subset of an Unclassified text should be Unclassified. In some scenarios, it may be acceptable to simply have the originating user or application specify the label attributes of the data object. However, if there is a significant security risk (e.g., interconnecting two domains with a large security span), higher assurance in the correctness of security labels is required.
One issue is that human users or applications may mislabel data by mistake, or even that an insider could intentionally mislabel data. A more fundamental problem with regard to the assurance of the solution itself is that the system could be subverted, e.g., by malware. In that case, the system may intentionally mislabel data, e.g., to enable exfiltration of confidential data. Note that such mislabelling may happen in different ways, e.g., through an automatic process not requiring human input or by deceiving a user into believing that either the data object or the security label being attached is different from what is actually the case. The latter might be achieved by displaying a data object (e.g., document) different from the one being labelled, or if additional information is hidden within the data object (e.g., as non-visible metadata or through steganographic techniques).
The use of high assurance systems resistant to subversion could mitigate this threat. However, there is often a requirement for users to be able to use commodity applications, or custom applications built on top of commodity operating systems, and no high assurance commodity operating system is likely to become available in the near future.
High confidence in security labels may in some scenarios be achieved by having a high assurance gateway in front of a given system or security domain, labelling information originating from that system/domain with a given label. For instance, all information originating from a Restricted domain may be labelled as Restricted without risk of leaking classified data. While such functionality is available in some guards (e.g., [3] ), it provides limited flexibility. For instance, it does not enable unclassified data produced at a Restricted workstation to be exported to an unclassified domain.
Thus, if one are to use one of the previous approaches, one basically has to choose between low assurance in the correctness of security labels (but high flexibility) or very limited flexibility (but potentially high assurance). Policybased labelling (PBL), as proposed in this paper, aims to strike a balance between these two extremes, by using policies to specify rules for how data objects can be labeled. As in Attribute Based Access Control, the policies are specified based on attributes, i.e., typically of the subject, the resource (i.e., the object to be labelled in our case), the action (i.e,. the specific label requested if any), and/or the environment. The proposed framework makes use of plug-in modules for evaluating the data to be labelled and for obtaining other attributes relevant to the policy decision. The attributes obtained by these plug-in modules are then used as input to a policy evaluation. This way, the policies determines how data objects are allowed to be labelled, while checks customized for specific scenarios or applications can be provided through plug-in modules.
The framework may be used to automatically label data objects, to enforce that the labeling performed by a subject (e.g., application/user) is according to policy, or some combination thereof. The framework may be implemented as a custom standalone device for higher assurance or be integrated on client machines (potentially using some type of separation mechanism for increased protection).
While the proposed framework may be deployed in different ways, some interesting possibilities arise if it also processes incoming data objects. The framework can then be set to effectively monitor the incoming data objects and their associated label attributes, and this information may then be used to help decide the label attributes of outgoing data objects. This, in addition to subject and environmental attributes, means that the proposed framework can utilize both previously identified bases for determining the label attributes of a data object.
It should be noted that PBL, depending on the exact policy configuration, can be used to create highly secure as well as completely insecure labelling configurations. Its power as such lies in the fact that it enables the policy creator(s) to specify policies providing an acceptable risk for a given deployment, enabling finely calibrated security checks to be added through custom plug-in modules. Due to the use of plug-in modules, the framework is also extensible with regard to object formats (e.g., file types or message types), although our implementation effort so far has focused on XML/SOAP. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the proposed policy-based labelling framework. We then briefly discuss various deployment options in Section III. Example use cases are given in Section IV, including a description of how monitoring of incoming data objects can be used to assist labelling. Section V describes our prototype implementation. Section VI presents a more detailed discussion of the policy aspects of PBL, including an overview of the XACML policy language. Section VII provides a survey of related work, before we conclude in Section VIII.
II. The proposed labelling framework
The basic idea of the proposed framework is that various information about the data object to be labelled and the circumstances under which this labelling is performed can be represented as attributes and be used as input for a policy decision. Apart from information about the data object itself, the attributes may, for instance, convey information about the subject (e.g., user or application) for which the data object is being labeled and the environment, including what type of information has previously been received or originated by the environment (e.g., terminal, virtual machine, etc.) originating the data object.
A functional high level design of the proposed labelling framework is shown in Figure 1 . We will first provide a brief overview, before a more detailed description of each functional component is provided. As can be seen, a data object for labelling is taken as input. This data object is first processed by one or more Attribute Modules, each returning a set of zero or more attributes. The set of attributes returned by the Attribute Modules are then provided to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) for a policy decision. In the normal case, the PDP returns its policy decision in the form of permit or deny and a set of obligations. A permit decision means that processing (i.e., labelling) of the given data object can proceed, while a deny decision means that further processing (i.e., the intended labelling) of the given data object is not allowed. In any case, any obligations returned by the PDP are to be handled by Obligation Handlers. The Attribute Modules and Obligation Handlers are plug-in modules that can be included with the framework, providing flexibility for different usage scenarios and applications, while the configured policies of the PDP provide the glue between them. The following provides a more detailed explanation of the role of each component.
A. Input/Output Handler
The Input/Output Handler is an optional component that is not part of the core framework, but that may be used to provide adaptations for various deployments. In addition to the data object, the Input/Output Handler may optionally also supply some input attributes to the framework. Such attributes may for instance include information about on what interface the data object has been received or label attributes requested to be set by the subject. The latter may also be achieved by having a label included together with the data object upon submission, where the subject suggest/request the label attribute(s) to be set. Input attributes could also include the identity of the subject, e.g., if authentication has been performed at a lower layer.
B. Dispatcher
The dispatcher is responsible for receiving each data object and then calling the applicable Attribute Module(s) according to configuration. It then sends a policy decision request to the PDP, containing the input attributes and the set of attributes returned by the Attribute Module(s). After receiving the decision from the PDP, the Dispatcher is responsible for calling any applicable Obligation Handlers and releasing or discarding the final data object in the case of a permit or deny respectively. The Dispatcher is also responsible for ensuring that each Attribute Module is only allowed to write to its own attribute name space in order to enforce separation of privilege between Attribute Modules.
C. Attribute Modules
There can be one or more Attribute Modules, 1 each returning a set of zero or more attributes. Each Attribute Module has read access to the data object and the set of attributes returned by any previously called Attribute Modules. Which Attribute Modules are called and in which order are specified by the configuration. 2 Examples of Attribute Modules may include content checkers (e.g., dirty-word and XML schema validation), subject authentication modules, subject attribute retrievers (e.g., based on SAML), and security label parsers. Depending on their implementation, Attribute Modules may also have access to external information, e.g., to retrieve information from a directory service.
D. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
The PDP is responsible for making the policy decision based on the attributes in the submitted decision request and the applicable policies. At the high level, the PDP has a set of policies and takes a set of attributes as inputs, and outputs a decision (permit or deny) together with a set of zero or more obligations. Although the exact language in which the policies are expressed is ultimately an implementation choice, we have chosen to utilize the XACML 3.0 policy language for this purpose. Our use of XACML 3.0 policies is further discussed in Section VI.
E. Obligation Handlers
There may be one or more obligation handlers, 3 each responsible for handling one or more obligation types, where each obligation is identified by an obligation attribute. An attribute value associated with the attribute is used to convey any additional information needed to carry out the obligation when necessary. Examples of possible Obligation Handlers include handlers for security labelling, content filtering/removal, logging, alerts, error messages, and label binding. A special obligation handler can also be used to enable policy writers to specify that additional Attribute Modules are to be run under specific conditions, thereafter resubmitting the policy decision request to the PDP including the new attributes.
F. Attribute Storage
The attribute storage is an optional component used for persistent storage of attributes. The attribute storage can be written to (including deleted from) by one or more Obligation Handlers, and can be read by Attribute Modules. Thus, the policies can specify that certain attributes are to be written to persistent storage given certain conditions, thereby enabling a historical context for later policy evaluations (for other data objects). It should be noted that each Attribute Module and Obligation Handler may also implement or have access to separate storage, e.g., an Obligation Handler for security logging may have append only access to a separate storage device.
III. Deployment alternatives
The framework can be deployed in different ways. One alternative is to deploy it on the same machine as the application originating the data to be labeled (e.g., a user machine or an application server). There are multiple ways in which this can be performed, the most basic one being that the application program uses the labelling framework as a library. For SOAP Web services, another option is to deploy the framework as a handler being applied to all messages by the Web services platform.
Another natural deployment option is to deploy the labeling framework as a service that can be called over the network. Depending on the policy, this may require authentication of the subject requesting labelling to be performed.
The framework could also be deployed as a gateway or proxy (as the labelling gateways for network A and node B in Figure 2 ). An advantage of the gateway approach is that the framework can be made non-bypassable in both directions, which as we will see facilitates some interesting applications. A gateway could for instance be positioned in front of each system for which labelling is to be performed (e.g., server, sensor, or workstation), in front of a set of systems, or in front of a network domain. While such a labelling gateway may typically be implemented as a separate device, it could also be integrated with a guard or in a separate non-bypassable MILS partition on the client/server (as node C in Figure 2) .
When deploying the framework on a user machine or similar (e.g., application server) one may consider separating the labelling framework from the remainder of the system for better security protection, e.g., using a separation kernel. Assuming labels are cryptographically protected, smart cards, hardware security modules, or similar may be used for protecting the cryptographic keys.
IV. Illustration Examples
The following will illustrate the functionality of the framework through a few simple examples.
A. Basic Labelling Examples
Let us first consider an example where we have a user who has been working on a data object (e.g., document) within a NATO Secret domain, and now wants to label this data object as NATO Restricted. The user or her application would then submit the data object to the labeling framework, depending on how the framework is deployed (as discussed in the previous section). The user would indicate that she wants to label the document as Unclassified, either by attaching an Unclassified label to the document or by supplying this information as input attributes to the labelling framework. Other input attributes supplied by the Input/Output Handler could typically include the subject identity (e.g., if authenticated by SSL/TLS over the network or by the operating system in the case of local invocation). Otherwise, means for subject authentication could also be included within the data object itself, e.g., by including a digital signature.
Upon receiving the data object and input attributes, the labelling framework first invokes the configured Attribute Modules. Each Attribute Module is provided as input the data object, the input attributes, and any attributes returned by previously called Attribute Modules. In our example case, there might for instance be one Attribute Module retrieving additional information about the subject (e.g., role, labelling privileges, etc.) from a directory service. Alternatively, this information could be supplied by a Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertion embedded within the data object, in which case an Attribute Module would be responsible for validating the SAML assertion and retrieving its attributes. Another Attribute Module could determine the type of the data object (e.g., document format or message type). Depending on type, the data object could for instance also be subject to a dirty word check, returning an attribute indicating the severity or category of any dirty-words found. All attributes (both input attributes and those obtained by the Attribute Modules) are then submitted to the PDP for a policy decision. In this example we will assume that we have a policy stating that the default action is to accept the user's proposed label given that the data object validates to a known allowed type, no dirty-words were found, the subject is authorized to perform such labelling, and the label is within a specified valid label range (e.g., NATO Unclassified, Restricted, or Secret, with a specified set of categories). Assuming these requirements are fulfilled, the policy evaluation will result in a "Permit" decision, i.e., meaning that the labeling process should proceed with executing the obligations specified (there could also be obligations specified for the case of "Deny"). In our example the obligations could include to attach the security label (unless this was already supplied by the subject), digitally sign the label and data object (i.e., confirming that the security label is attached according to policy), and to log the result for audit purposes. All these obligations would need to be performed by the respective obligation handlers before the labelled data object is returned.
It may be noted that custom Attribute Modules may be included for specific applications. For instance, an Attribute Module could be included for NATO Friendly Force Information (NFFI) messages. 4 Such an Attribute Module could for instance retrieve the the positional data from the NFFI message, so that this information may be used during policy evaluation. This way, one could for instance specify that only NFFI messages relating to a certain geographic area are to be marked as releasable to a given coalition partner. 4 The NATO Friendly Force Information (NFFI) standard defines a message format and protocol for exchanging information on friendly forces during coalition operations [4] . A NFFI message is an XML file that contains at least the mandatory fields Positional data (longitude, latitude and altitude), Velocity, ID (name and text string), and Operational status.
B. Information Flow Assisted Labelling
If we deploy the labeling framework in such a way that all incoming and outgoing traffic (e.g, to the node, domain, or virtual machine) can be monitored, we can potentially maintain complete records of all the content that each environment receives and sends out. This is for instance the case in Figure  2 , where the labelling component has been deployed such that all in-and outbound traffic to/from computer B, the application partition (e.g., virtual machine) within computer C, and the network partition A can be controlled. If we consider D the larger network, all information would typically be labeled before entering D, although there may also be policies for labeling unlabeled information originating from D. The information collected through such monitoring can later be utilized to determine the label attributes of new data objects, for instance: 1) "High Water Mark" -Through continuous monitoring, we can keep track of the highest classification level of the data that the environment originating the data object to be labelled has received. We can then use this value to enforce a "high water mark" policy, in which we restrict a node to only sending out data with the security classification set to the same (or higher) level as that of the most highly classified data object it has received. This may be particularly be useful when combined with what we refer to as instantiated environments, that can be (re)started from a known information state for each worksession. For instance, the separation kernel on computer C could be configured to allow the labelling framework to restart the application partition clearing its state. 2) Misusability Weight -A less rigid alternative to the high water mark policy is to take a risk based approach. Such an approach could be based on an assessment of the potential damage that could be caused if an environment/user leaks the information it possess. This could for instance be performed by computing a misuseability weight for each environment, similar to the Textual Misuseability score (TM-Score) proposed in [5] . The security labels of the information exchanged would be used to assist the calculation of the misuseability weight, and the misuseability weight would then be used as an input attribute to the PDP for labeling decisions. 3) Similarity Checking -If we index all data objects passing through the labelling mechanism, we can compute the similarities of incoming and outgoing data objects, using for example the cosine similarity measure [6] . This knowledge about similarity with other data objects, whose label attributes are known, can then be utilized as input to the policy decision. Such signature checking might be applicable to media data as well, e.g., videos, images, and audio files.
V. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of the proposed framework in a mixture of Clojure and Java, utilizing a XACML 3.0 PDP for the policy decision point.
As the framework needs to be able to specify obligations on a per-rule basis, we rely on the latest version of XACML (3.0), which introduced rule-level obligation expressions. Previous versions of XACML only supports obligations at the policy level. Although it is technically possible to achieve the same effect by using multiple policies instead of multiple rules, this would in quickly result in an impractical large number of polices. At the time of writing, there are several robust open-source Java implementations of XACML 3.0 available, e.g., Balana by WSO2 [7] and a framework made available by AT&T [8] . For our prototype implementation, we opted for using the Balana version. This decision was primarily based on the fact that the AT&T version had just been released when we started the project.
The Attribute Modules and Obligation Handlers are implemented as classes of the interfaces "AttributeModule" and "ObligationHandler" respectively. Thus, if a user wants to adapt the framework to a specific use case then she would only need to provide custom implementations of these two sets of classes and alter the configuration settings accordingly. With modularity, flexibility, and extendability in mind, we designed the system such that the set of Attribute Modules and obligation handlers that need to be executed are specified in a configuration file, which is read once on start-up and then re-read on any subsequent modifications.
So far, we have implemented several Attribute Modules to be able to test the basic functionality of the framework: 1) Dirty word -This module extracts all the text from a XML file, tokenizes the result and matches the tokenstream against a set of predefined categories of "dirty words." The attribute value is a list of "dirty word" categories.
2) Schema validation -Attempts to validate a provided XML file against a set of pre-defined schemas. The resulting attribute value is a list of matched schema names. 3) Maxium security label -Extracts all the security classifications present in a file that uses the "XML Confidentiality Label". The highest security classification encountered is returned as the attribute value. 4) User -Dummy module that returns hardcoded user data such as role, username, security-clearance, age, gender, and phone-number. 5) NFFI positional data -Parses an NFFI message and returns the positional data as the attribute value. 6) Signature verification -validates the signature of an XML/SOAP document. We have also currently implemented some Obligation Handlers: 1) Email -Sends an email to the security administration team. 2) Change Label -Changes the security label.
3) Reevaluate -Initiate a policy reevaluation. 4) Attribute persistence -Write attributes to the attribute store. 5) Insert -Inserts an XML element (e.g., an XML Confidentiality label) at specified position in an XML document.
VI. Policies, attributes, and obligations
Attributes are key-value pairs that serve as the main building blocks of ABAC systems, where it represents the properties of the entities involved in an authorization request. By utilizing a well-established and much studied access control paradigm in the policy-based labelling framework, we achieve the benefit of not having to re-engineer libraries and code. It also enables the security administrators to express the labeling logic in terms of familiar concepts, potentially using existing tools for policy management.
All rules are evaluated based on the subject, data object (i.e., resource), action (i.e., the label attributes requested by the subject), and environment attributes. In terms of the set of features that must be provided by a framework in order to support rules of this form we needed: 1) A component that extracts the attributes from the involved entities (i.e., Attribute Modules) 2) A policy evaluation engine that uses the attributes to express when a rule should be triggered (i.e., XACML PDP and policies) 3) Operation sets associated with each rule that are executed depending on the outcome of the rule (i.e., Obligation Handlers) How these components are implemented in the framework, i.e., as attribute modules and obligation handlers, is outlined in Section II, and in the following sections, we will provide a brief review of the XACML 3.0 standard before giving a more in-depth description of how policies, obligations and attributes are utilized in the framework. 
A. XACML
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a specification for defining access control policies using XML. As shown in Figure 3 , the XACML rule constitutes the basic building block for defining policies in XACML. Each rule has an effect, either permit or deny. Furthermore, each rule may specify a target. The target of a rule defines the subjects, resources, actions, and/or environments to which the rule applies (i.e., who may, or may not, do what to which resource given the environment).
A rule may also contain a condition, further restricting the applicability of the rule. Such a condition may involve attributes of the subject, resource, action, and/or environment, and can make use of arithmetical, comparative, set, and Boolean operators. Thus, XACML provides high granularity for defining rules and allows rules to be made context sensitive. A condition may for instance involve the role of the subject, the time of day, and/or previous events.
A XACML rule is not to exist on its own, but instead as part of a XACML policy. In case there is more than one rule in a policy, these are interrelated by a rule-combining algorithm. Three different rule combining algorithms are defined: denyoverrides, permit-overrides, and first-applicable. In addition, custom algorithms can be defined.
The target of a policy may be determined from the targets of its rules or specified explicitly. If no target is specified by a rule, the target of the rule is taken to be the same as the target of the containing policy. The target is used by the PDP to determine if the policy/rule is applicable to a given request. Consequently, the effective target of a rule is at least as strict as the target of the containing policy (i.e., PDPs only consider the rules within applicable policies).
A policy may also specify obligations. Such obligations may for instance be that an e-mail should be sent to the resource owner if access is granted or that denied requests for access should be logged. In order to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled, any obligations should be carried out before granting access. In the latest XACML specification (3.0) rules may also specify obligations.
Another newly introduced feature is the Advice statement, which is a type of obligation that may be ignored.
Policies may again be combined into a policy set in the same way that rules are combined into policies. The algorithms for this are equivalent to the ones for combining rules, with the addition of an only-one-applicable algorithm, where only one policy is to be applicable to a given request/ target. A PDP's response to a request is either permit, deny, not applicable (i.e. if no policy/rule was applicable), or indeterminate (i.e. if an error occurred). One or more obligations (and/or advices) may also be specified, and access must be denied unless all the obligations can be fulfilled.
B. Usage of XACML Policies, Attributes, and Obligations
Policies are what make up the logical component of the framework and can be thought of as the connection between the Attribute Modules and the Obligation Handlers, in the sense that the attributes of a labeling request are effectively mapped to a set of obligations by the policies. This mapping is specified through the use of XACML policy rules as described in Section VI-A. Whereas in XACML, the rules are used mainly to derive a final Permit/Deny outcome, we are primarily interested in the effects of the accompanying obligations. Each rule/obligation pair describes an operation to perform for a request whose attributes satisfies the rule's condition statement. All obligations of applicable rules whose effect matches the final evaluation outcome (permit/deny) are to be carried out.
Returning to the content checking example discussed earlier in Section IV, we can now express how to check for the presence of dirty words in terms of a XACML condition. Let us assume that we have an Attribute Module that extracts the textual contents of the document, tokenizes the resulting text, matches the token stream against a set of known "dirty words," and then maps these words to categories before finally taking as the attribute value this list of matched categories. Our XACML rule, shown in Figure 4 , creates a bag of categories by using the string-bag function and checks if any of the "dirtyword-category" attribute values are members of this bag by applying the string-at-least-one-member-of function. If there is at least one match, the rule is applicable and evaluates to "Permit". Assuming there are no further policies or rules that causes the policy decision to evaluate to "Deny", the obligations associated with a "Permit" decision must be fulfilled. In this example, we want the presence of a "dirty word category" to imply that the appropriate security level is "NATO Secret," and as such we can represent this by an obligation (and obligation handler) that when executed changes the label of the document to "NATO Secret". We can achieve this effect through the use of a rule-level obligation in combination with either an "AttributeAssignment" or "AttributeAssignmentExpression" obligation element, which we simply use to pass arguments to the obligation handler class from the policy. In Figure 4 we show this by calling the obligation handler "SetSecurityLabel" with the attribute "securityLabel" set to "NATO Secret."
As XACML policies can become quite complex, a suitable tool should be used for policy management.
VII. Related Work
The proposed solution represents an application of attribute based access control (ABAC) principles to the process of information labelling. While ABAC is concerned with deciding whether access should be granted or not (i.e., permit or deny), our objective is to decide what security label to apply to a given data object. In particular, our work makes use of the XACML 3.0 [9] ABAC policy language. While XACML also provides an architectural access control framework, the PDP is the only component that we actually utilize from this. Still, one could say that the Dispatcher and Obligation handlers, in our framework, loosely corresponds to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) in XACML and that our Attribute Modules <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="dirtyword-categories"> <Condition> <Apply FunctionId="string-at-least-one-member-of"> <Apply FunctionId="string-bag"> <AttributeValue DataType="string"> DirtyWord-Category-1 </AttributeValue> <AttributeValue DataType="string"> DirtyWord-Category-2 </AttributeValue> <AttributeValue DataType="string"> DirtyWord-Category-3 </AttributeValue> </Apply> <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="true" AttributeId="dirtyword-category" Category="object" DataType="string"/> </Apply> </Condition> <ObligationExpressions> <ObligationExpression FulfillOn="Permit" ObligationId="SetSecurityLabel"> <AttributeAssignment DataType="string" AttributeId="securityLabel" Category="object"> NATO Secret </AttributeAssignment> </ObligationExpression> </ObligationExpressions> </Rule> to some extent resembles a Policy Information Point (PIP) in XACML (i.e., providing attributes of the subject, object, environment and action). The information flow between the components do however also differ from that in XACML.
A variation of ABAC, Content-based Protection and Release (CPR) [10] , has been proposed for future use in NATO. In CPR attributes within a content label are used to convey the properties of an information object. Access decisions are then based on protection and release policies effectively expressing requirements (in terms of attributes) on the user and her terminal and/or environment in order to be granted access to information objects with such properties. CPR depends on the ability to assign content properties to information objects, and the work proposed in this paper may as such be used with CPR to determine the content properties of data objects (either automatically or in cooperation with the user).
The CPR paper [10] also present the NATO Metadata Binding Service (NMBS). NMBS can be used to bind specified metadata (e.g., a security label) to an information object, using a binding mechanism of particular strength (e.g., digital signature). Similar services are also available as commercial products, e.g., [11] . Our proposal differs from these solutions by providing a framework for determining what label attributes are to, and should not, be included within a given data object's security label according to policy. The binding of the security label to the data object is in our framework to be performed within an Obligation Handler (or alternatively by the Input/Output Handler), and may in principle be realized by invoking a binding service if for some reason not to be implemented locally. By providing a service interface, our framework may also be deployed as a labelling service itself.
Part of the motivation for the work in this paper is that it is difficult to assure that a data object being labelled does not contain unintended information or has a wrong label attached. This is particularly the case on a commodity platform providing limited assurance. This problem is related to the the problem of knowing whether what you actually sign with a digital signature is what you see when you sign an electronic document, which is a well known problem (e.g., [12] ). Labelling of data objects is nevertheless different from that of users electronically signing juridical contracts and approving financial transactions. Because data objects to be labelled may be generated at a relatively high rate, and potentially are large and in a format unsuitable for human review, it is not practical to have the user review and confirm the action on a separate device. For many labelling applications (e.g, sensor data), there may not even be a human user present. This is also reflected by the fact that, apart from the internal labelling used for mandatory access control in some high assurance operating systems, existing approaches to higher assurance data labeling are typically based on the use of "labelling gateways". An example of this include the XML/SOAP guard presented in [3] , which may be configured to label outgoing information with a specific label. While the framework proposed in this paper may also be deployed as a gateway (e.g., as part of a guard), it has the advantage of providing the means for determining the label attributes of different data objects (i.e., through the use of Attribute Modules combined with attribute based policy evaluation).
If there are less stringent requirements for assurance, e.g., for scenarios involving relatively low risk, labelling may also be performed by the user on a commodity system. Several applications for this are offered by Titus [13] , e.g., enabling a user to label files on Microsoft Windows and providing plugins for use within Microsoft Office applications. A similar plug-in for Microsoft Outlook is also available from SMHS [14] , utilizing a security label service from Isode [15] .
A planned solution for automatic confidentiality classification of non-structured text is discussed in [16] . It focuses on the use of machine learning techniques to determine the confidentiality classification of unstructured data (e.g., documents). The results of this work could potentially be utilized for creating Attribute Modules within the framework presented in this paper. While [16] anticipate the use of Sun's XACML 2.0 implementation for policy-based classification, this is not further explored. The anticipated use of XACML in their solution would however apparently be quite different from our. There is for instance no mention of XACML obligations, which our use of XACML is completely dependent upon. As discussed, this is also the reason why XACML 2.0 is not suitable for use as part of our framework, as it lacks support for rule-level obligations. Furthermore, our proposal is fundamentally based on ABAC/XACML principles, utilizing Attribute Modules to obtain attributes to be used as input to the policy decision for performing the classification, and then Obligation Handlers for fulfilling the policy outcomes. The potential monitoring of incoming data objects to help determine the label attributes of a data object is another differentiating factor of our proposal that has the potential to significantly improve the decision basis.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of policybased labelling as an ABAC inspired approach to data labelling, and proposed a framework for for policy-based labelling of data objects. A prototype of the proposed framework has been implemented as a proof-of-concept and will be used for further experimentation. Furthermore, we have provided several examples of how the policy-based labelling framework can be utilized.
Fully automatic labelling of data objects is just one potential application of the proposed solution. The use of the framework to enforce that the label attributes suggested by the subject (e.g., user or application) is according to policy may be at least as important. A variation of the latter could also be to utilize the framework for aiding the subject as to what label attributes to apply. Alternatively, one might choose to generally accept the labels suggested by the subjects, but utilize the framework for selecting suspicious cases for additional audit. Due to its flexible plug-in architecture and rich policy language, the framework is also well suited for performing translation between different security policies and label formats.
While our current prototype implementation has not been implemented with assurance in mind, a main property of the proposed solution is that it enables the enforcement of the labelling policy to be separated from low assurance commodity user/application platforms. This enables the labelling mechanism to be implemented with higher assurance (e.g., on a separate platform with a high assurance operating system or using some type of isolation mechanism on the user/application platform). This way, it can be assured that data objects are in fact labelled according to the labelling policy. As part of a larger solution, the overall assurance that for instance classified data is not leaked will however also depend on the specific labeling policy and Attribute Modules, seen in combination with what is known about the potential input. While some information sources (e.g., sensors) produce data that is relatively easily assessable with regard to label attributes, less may be known in advance about other sources producing potentially unstructured and diverse content (e.g., written documents). The ability to monitor incoming data objects to the environment from which labelling is being requested is as such considered an important element for improving the decision basis in such more general scenarios.
Continuing, we plan to further investigate the use of the policy-based labelling framework for determining the labelling attributes of data objects, including the use of more advanced Attribute Modules. In particular we want to further investigate information flow assisted labelling and risk based approaches to labelling as discussed in Section IV.
